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# Lexical Change in Times of Upheaval and War – And the Dictionary

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## Abstract

We consider how to address lexicographically words, expressions, and usages that are for the most part quite recent in the Russian language – when their newness may mean that known dictionaries or lexicographic corpora do not cover them fully. We refer to "usages" because the prevailing linguistic situation in the Russian language is rife not only with new words, but also with new word combinations, new connotations, new meanings, broadened or extended meanings as well as other linguistic phenomena. Our focus is the examination of a variety of real contexts for these neologisms, with comment on the lexicographic strengths and weaknesses of each context. The essential lexicographic questions are: What are the characteristics of any successful lexicographic context? When a usage is new and existing corpora may not reflect it, how should lexicographers evaluate and use other types of contexts in their work? How should connotation, given its propensity to change quickly, be treated in lexicographic definition and in illustrative examples, whether in online or in print dictionaries?

**Keywords:** connotation; denotation; explanation of meaning

## 1 Introduction

As would be clear to anyone reading Russian-language sources related to the events in Ukraine over the past few years, the current Russian language is a very fertile linguistic territory, rife with new words, expressions, and usages. The events in question are, of course, the ousting of the pro-Russian Ukrainian president, the Russian takeover of the Crimea, and the unrest and war in eastern Ukraine. Many of the new Russian words, word combinations, broadened or extended meanings of previously existing words, connotations, and other recent linguistic phenomena are directly associated with these events. Other neologisms may pre-date these events or pertain to phenomena beyond their scope. Many usages are related to Russian views toward Europe or the United States. While numerous new usages express anti-liberal or anti-Western views, others indicate a liberal or anti-Putin perspective. Certainly, all of the writers, whether in the formal Press or in more informal social media, are using these new words and expressions to cue their readership as to their views and intentions. Writers are using both *denotation* and *connotation* to influence their readers' understanding of events; some are reacting by reappropriating new words used negatively to describe themselves positively, and so on. The goal of the present investigation is to chronicle some of the changing linguistic phenomena in the Russian language via authentic and often unconventional contexts, with suggestions for effective treatment in dictionaries.

The sheer number of new usages emanating from Russia is of course huge, so here we will present only a few. Some nouns that describe people and places in the wartime Russian/Ukrainian world have

been chosen. As certain nouns begin to be used more frequently, adjectives and verbs with related meanings come into existence; these will sometimes be noted in passing. For the most part we look at usage in the Russian language. Many of the words have variants in Ukrainian, and most likely in other Slavic languages as well. While this discussion may address phonological, syntactic or morphological characteristics sporadically, the main emphasis is on *explanation of meaning* and on how these meanings could or should be treated in the dictionary. Certainly many new usages will prove to be ephemeral – they will not "stick" in the language – but this in itself should no longer hinder their full coverage in online dictionaries where space, while still a consideration, is not by any means the issue it once was, in the era of print dictionaries (Landau 2001). This is already happening today: a few Russian online dictionaries have already covered words that previously existed but have now taken on new meanings. It will most likely be a slower process for brand new words or expressions to be included.

## 2 Denotation and Connotation

The *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* online defines *denotation* as: "a direct specific meaning as distinct from an implied or associated idea." *Connotation* is: "an idea or quality that a word makes you think about in addition to its meaning." Similarly, Ladislav Zgusta considers connotation "as a broad category comprising all further semantically relevant properties of the word" apart from its denotation (1971: 39). As an illustrative example of *denotation*, *Merriam-Webster* online gives: "The definition provides the word's *denotation*." This is a good example for a lexicographer (though its significance may be obscure to the general reader) because dictionaries only sporadically tell users anything about a word's connotation – which is sometimes, but by far not always, treated indirectly in the illustrative examples accompanying the explanation of meaning. In other words, describing connotation has not been a main goal of dictionary entries, and as a result connotation has not received systematic treatment even indirectly via the illustrative examples.

The habitual lexicographic practice – of treating denotation within definition (explanation of meaning) and sometimes adding in connotation in illustration (illustrative example phrases or sentences) – was logical in the large print dictionary projects of the past. Such dictionaries took decades to complete, so information about the usually more lexically stable denotation would be more likely to remain valid over a longer time span. On the other hand, connotation can evolve more quickly (as the present Russian situation will show), so that more emphasis on connotation – even through the indirect description of it in examples – might previously have made a dictionary appear dated too soon. Before a dictionary that took years to make even appeared in print, the connotation would most likely have changed more than the denotation. In modern lexicography where lexical change can be and is being registered more quickly, a changing connotation could be captured more often and more easily than before. However, as Zgusta warns and as we will see below, "the connotative values show greater variations from one speaker to another" than do denotations (1971: 41). Since connotative change could end up causing permanent change in the lexical meaning (the denotation) of a word, it is certainly worth registering connotation more extensively, precisely, and systematically, especially in modern online dictionaries. Well-selected illustrative examples could often serve this purpose, although registering always slippery connotation in the dictionary even as connotation is changing more quickly due to social upheaval will always be a lexicographic challenge.

### 3 Social Upheaval and Lexical Change

It is reasonable to consider lexical change in the current Russian language as only one example of a not uncommon situation, in which significant social disturbance leads to linguistic innovation. This idea was captured well at the beginning of the last century by the linguist Baudouin de Courtenay, known to many of us not just as a brilliant phonologist, but as a lexicographer for his revision of Vladimir Dal's Russian dictionary<sup>1</sup> and many other lexicographic works (Farina & Durman 2012). Due to severe criticism in the Russian Press and ultimately due to government censorship of his revision of Dal' in pre-Soviet Russia, Baudouin felt compelled to explain some of his lexicographic decisions that had come under fire – decisions that were partly influenced by the political reality of his time, the Revolution of 1905 in Russia (Farina & Durman 2012). Baudouin notes:

Words, examples, and citations which I added to *Dal's Dictionary* [...] can be divided into two categories: those I recorded over many years and those which have their origin in the past few years – years of political disturbances and fundamental cataclysm in the worldview of almost all classes of society.

Because of these upheavals, there occurred not only swift change in the various spheres of life but certainly equally swift change in the understanding of some words. If in normal and peaceful times word meaning changes [...] constantly, depending on where people live, what class of society and even what [political] “party” they belong to, then it is all the more necessary for more significant changes [...] to take place in our “revolutionary” and extremely anarchic times. For opposing “parties,” the same words can have different and sometimes diametrically opposed meanings, and provoke different emotions. But if a dictionary aspires to relative completeness, then it must [...] take into consideration even these differences of meaning – which are no less important than, for example, variety in local dialects [...]. I intended to bring all of these additions – new definitions and examples – into the [revised] dictionary (Boduèn de Kurtène 23 Nov 1906: 2).

Sergei Kartsevskii, in his 1923 book, *Language, War and Revolution*, took up Baudouin's baton with his examination of lexical change following the 1917 Russian Revolution. While living beyond the borders of the Soviet Union he could write candidly:

The events of recent years could not but impact our language [...]. Socio-political change, radical disruption of everyday life, new daily realities, and an exceptionally volatile reaction to these things [...] from the society – all of this has left a deep imprint on the Russian language, specifically on our lexicon. Linguistic novelties have accumulated to such an extent that some observers are already speaking of a “linguistic revolution.” [...] The linguistic changes of recent years cannot be considered apart from their connection with the previous wave of new usages going back to the period around 1905. Truly the events of our days are only one link in the chain of socio-political upheavals beginning around 1905. (2000: 217)

From within the Soviet Union we have a more reticent view from the distinguished linguist Afanasii Selishchev in his 1928 book, *Language of the Revolutionary Era*.<sup>2</sup> He notes:

The terms *party*, [...] *party member*, [...] have acquired a meaning that is synonymous with *Communist Party*,

<sup>1</sup>*Explanatory Dictionary of the Living Russian Language* [*Tolkovyi slovar' zhivogo velikoruskogo iazyka*], first published 1863–1866 by Vladimir Ivanovich Dal'. Baudouin's 3<sup>rd</sup> revised edition appeared from 1903–1909, and his 4<sup>th</sup> revised edition appeared from 1912 to 1914.

<sup>2</sup> His careful wording of his ideas did not keep Selishchev out of deep trouble. As noted by historian of linguistics Vladimir Alpatov, his book was later denounced in a speech as a “subtly and skillfully hidden slandering of our revolution” (2012: 8).

*Communist*. In this meaning, the word *party* and its derivatives are used throughout the entire country.

Some political parties outside of the USSR with a hostile attitude to the Communist program have been castigated [i.e., within the USSR] with strong, harsh, emotionally charged words and expressions such as: *renegades, appeasers, traitors, insolent gang of servants of capitalism, lackeys of the bourgeoisie, stooges, Judases*, etc. (2013: 98)

In Selishchev's 1925 article, "Revolution and Language," he comments:

One of the elements of revolutionary language is a sort of familiarity and coarseness of style. So it was in the speech of French revolutionaries, and so it is in the speech and writing of the public figures of our own time: *frenzied bourgeoisie, White Guard scum*, etc. (1968: 143).

A more modern observer of linguistic change in times of upheaval, Lidia Starodubtseva, a cultural historian and professor at Kharkov National University in Ukraine, wrote on *Radio Svoboda*:

Probably, in half a century of peaceful life, the Ukrainian and Russian languages have changed less than during only one year of war. [...] What kind of transformation is language subjected to in time of war? Does language suffer its own "linguistic jerk" that causes an avalanche-like process of chaotic word formation [...]?

Why not consider that in the life of language there are "peaceful" periods of stability and quiet, and "warlike" periods when there is a revolutionary "explosion" in the lexical paradigm? Exactly this convulsive, traumatic rupture [...] in times of war I would like to call a "wartime-linguistic swerve."

[...] I can say that a "wartime-linguistic swerve" exists simultaneously on at least three levels: in everyday experience, in media space, and in the standard language. The borders between these levels are open and cause a free fermentation of words and ideas. For example, from the everyday lexicon concepts migrate to the world of tweets and retweets, posts and reposts in social media, and from there easily move into official linguistic space.

On the other hand, coming to meet these everyday concepts is the language of the State's ideological communications – the language of Power as transmitted through the Press. Thanks to an entire production apparatus generating messages to order, and to the work of a large army of Internet "trolls," the State's messages are "thrust" into the consciousness of the mass culture. The Press is not just serving as a go-between transmitting these messages, but the medium is the message. In our situation, [...] the media is becoming a production machine of the languages of conflict as well as the battlefield for the clash of languages (4 April 2015).

An important aspect of Starodubtseva's notion of a "swerve" is its multidirectionality between her three levels (everyday language, social media, and standard language). While it is likely that many (most?) of the new usages in the Russian language have moved from common speech to social media "up" toward more linguistically standard and formal speech and media, there is also considerable evidence of the efforts, often successful, of the formal Russian media and the Putin administration to use the current linguistically and politically charged state of affairs to introduce their own usages, which then expand "downward" through formal and social media into everyday speech (Chen 2 Jun 2015; *GlobalVoices* 14 Mar 2015; Soldatov and Borogan 2015).

While the exact origin of a new usage may not always be relevant to its lexicographic definition, it is often necessary to track the origin and spread of a neologism as part of lexicographic work. Etymological, encyclopedic, or other extralinguistic information about how a new word came about can assist in the interpretation of the real contexts when they are, lexicographically speaking, less than ideal. What is more, as the presentation and format of many modern online dictionaries strongly

suggest, the non-definitional information about a word or expression is often just as important or more important to users than the lexicographic definition itself. The treatment of *Achilles' heel* in the online *Merriam-Webster Unabridged* versus its treatment in the crowdsourced *Wiktionary* is a good example of this. The *Merriam* definition is lexicographically well done and is followed by only the briefest note on the Achilles legend, while *Wiktionary's* quite copious information on the legend precedes (and almost eclipses) the less impressive definition.

#### 4 2014 Word of the Year: *Krymnash*

*Krymnash* "the Crimea belongs to us" (*Krym* "the Crimea" + *nash* "ours") was chosen as the 2014 Word of the Year following a contest at Saint Petersburg University. This gleeful slogan expressed the view of a majority of Russians that the Crimea should belong to Russia, of people who felt empowered by its acquisition. #*Krymnash* (in Cyrillic) is an active hashtag on Twitter. Many of the contexts on the Internet for *krymnash* talk about the expression itself rather than actually using it. So while *krymnash* is discussed and used everywhere, useful lexicographic illustrative examples are rare. The following example, while useful, is limited due to its brevity:

(1) Ludmilla Sibel 7 Oct 2014 Русские боятся выезжать за границу. Зато **крымнаш**. [Russians are afraid to go abroad, but at least the Crimea is ours.]

While this comment appears to be ironic, without more information its intent is not clear. In the next example, a tweet from an anti-Putinist, we see that as well as being used as a slogan or expression, *krymnash* can also be used as an animate and countable noun referring to people who support the Russian acquisition of the Crimea:

(2) A. Ponukalov @APonukalov 8 Apr 2016 Среди русского воря **крымнашей** стало еще больше [Among Russian thieves there are now even more Crimea-supporters (*krymnashi*, a plural noun)]

The connotation above appears to be negative, although this noun would most commonly be used positively by those who would call themselves *krymnashi* – supporters of Russian control of the Crimea. Almost every new usage that has been a part of this "linguistic swerve" has received some kind of direct linguistic response, and *krymnash* is no exception. The opposing (minority) viewpoint can be seen in another animate noun, *krymnashist* ("the Crimea" + "ours" + "fascist"), that plays on the sound similarity of *-nashist* and *fashist* "fascist" to mean, with negative connotation, a person who supports the Russian takeover of the Crimea:

(3) **senderkin** @senderkin 7 Apr 2016 Знакомый запутинский **крымнашист**, после полугодового поиска работы по рабочей специальности, стал уже отказываться от Крым [My pro-Putin acquaintance is a Crimea-fascist (*krymnashist*); after looking for a job in his specialty for half a year, he began to oppose the Crimean takeover]

Sometimes related-sounding words or words opposed in meaning are juxtaposed, as in the expression *krymnash – namkrysh* "now that the Crimea is ours, it's over for us" (*nam* "for us" + *kryshka* "death; the end"). A similar expression is *krymnash ili namkrysh?* "is the Crimea ours or are we finished?" It can express worry about the loss of status of Russia on the world stage, the economic and financial situation in Russia, or the long term implication of Russia's actions in the Crimea. For example:

(4) gramarsverdlov 2015-02-09 00:53 RT @S\_E\_R\_Z\_H\_: В **КРЫМНАШ НАМКРЫШ**

наступает конкретно!!!!!!!!!!!! [IN OUR CRIMEA IT'S THE END is really happening!!!!!!!!!!!!]

Above, *krymnash* is apparently a proper noun (with the preposition *v* "in") with the meaning "our Crimea" or just "Crimea." According to Vishnevetskaia (2015), it has also been used as the name for a newborn child, harkening back to the days when boys were named *Lenin* or *Traktor* "tractor" and girls *Stalina*. The next example is useful in showing how *namkrysh* is sometimes used alone, without *krymnash*:

(5) Victor Kir @ dialog2x2 Путин памаги...**НамКрыш!** "Люди у нас нищают, Крым превращается в захалустье" [Puten, halp ... We're finished (*namkrysh*)! "Here people are becoming destitute, the Crimea is turning into a backwater"]

The purposeful misspellings of Putin's name and the word for "help" indicate that the comment is likely ironic, with the author most likely expressing skepticism about the possibility for effective action in the Crimea on the part of the Russian government. However, as the meaning is not completely clear this would not be a good lexicographic illustrative example.

## 5 Reappropriation

Another common linguistic reaction in a "swerve" can be seen in the series of words translated as "Jew/Yid-Banderite." There are many forms: *zhidobanderoverts*, *banderoverts* (m. sing.); *zhidobandera* (m./f. sing. and sometimes collective); *zhidobanderovertsy*, *banderovertsy* (plur.); *zhidobanderovskii*, *banderovskii* (adj.). These are combinations of the nouns *zhid* "Yid, Jew" and "Banderite;" the latter signifies a follower of the Ukrainian political leader Stepan Bandera. An important figure during World War II, Bandera advocated for Ukrainian independence and was assassinated by the KGB. The juxtaposition of *zhid-o-* with *banderoverts* is noteworthy, since Bandera's movement was accused of anti-Semitism. Such juxtaposition is not surprising, since a characteristic of lexical change in recent years is that unlikely words or word components with seemingly little in common are being combined in Russian. This series of words signifies Jews or others who support the Ukrainian "nationalists" – Jews and/or Russian or Ukrainian citizens who support the events of *Maidan* (Kiev Independence Square) and the current Ukrainian government. Originally these coinages were above all meant to have the utmost negative and offensive connotation, as the two following examples show:

(6) Леонид@SPB\_citizen 10 May 2014 Не, я против нормальных евреев ничего, таки не имею. Но согласитесь, это же странно, что **#Жидобандеровцы** #олигархи спонсируют укрофашистов. [No, I've nothing against normal Jews. But you have to agree, it's strange that the #Yid-Banderites #oligarchs sponsor Ukrainian fascists.]

(7) Milked@kitrya 10 Mar 2016 Феминистка-жидобандера-лгбт-рептилоид американского происхождения. Это мальчики в редакции придумали нового героя для российских сми [...] [The feminist–Jew–Banderite–LGBT–American reptiloid. The boys in the newsroom have thought up a new hero for Russian mass media]

Most likely neither of the above would be chosen as an illustrative example in traditional lexicography, because they raise a variety of semantic questions beyond the use of the target word. Nevertheless, these examples do provide the lexicographer with a glimpse at the way these words are currently being used, a glimpse that could be helpful both in the defining process and in the selection of a better illustrative example.

*Zhidobanderovets* and related forms were very quickly reappropriated by the targeted groups to subvert the intended slur into an expression of pride in identity (Galinsky *et al.* 2003). These words are now often positively connoted among Jews and other supporters of the Ukrainian government. At one point in time, people were so conscious of these words that it was difficult to find a real disparaging usage that was not itself ironic. Example (7) above is of this type: the author is aware that the word is negatively connoted, but the author disparages the insult inherent in the word by ironically grouping Jew-Banderites with other "enemies" of the Russian Press, like feminists, lesbians, gays, Americans, etc. Today this situation seems to have changed, so that both types of usages can be found easily: those with either a reappropriated positive connotation or the original negative connotation. The author of the example below is apparently using *zhidobanderovtsy* positively, judging from the person's Twitter feed:

(8) Нетипичный Шушпан @ane4ka\_shu 23 Apr 2016 Подольск, Россия [Podolsk, Russia] Еще раз с Песахом, дорогие **жидобандеровцы** [Happy Passover again, dear Jew-Banderites (*zhidobanderovtsy*, plural)]

The example alone does not make the connotation clear; only reading the Twitter feed allows the conclusion that the author meant something positive. So the above would not be recommended as a lexicographic example meant illustrating positive connotation. On the other hand, the following comment, from *Russkii Mir* [Russian world], a nationalist website, is clearly negative:

(9) #РусскийМир @VladMatveev 30 Apr 2016 **Жидобандеровцы** готовят на 2 мая новое нападение на активистов антимайдана [The Jew-Banderites are preparing for May 2 a new attack on the anti-Maidan activists]

This example is not bad as an illustrative example. Using it in a dictionary could shed light on the most common meaning of, and the negative connotation of *zhidobanderovtsy*.

## 6 The Role of Etymology

We noted in Section 3 above that etymological and other extralinguistic information can assist in the interpretation of a new word's contexts; this point is relevant to the discussion of *kolorad*. The Colorado potato beetle was known to every child in the Soviet Union of the 1950s. It was emblazoned on the notebooks ubiquitous in the state school supply stores. Cold War propaganda alleged that the bug was parachuted into the Eastern Bloc by the CIA to destroy potato production and cause misery. The new sense of *kolorad*, mostly used as the plural *kolorady*, refers to pro-Russian fighters in east Ukraine or (by extension) Russian citizens supporting Russian government activities in east Ukraine. Since pro-Russian militants are being compared to an insect pest, the pejorative connotation is clear. *Radio Liberty* online points out: "For post-Soviet citizens, the unloved, destructive insects are also synonymous with imperialist plots and foreign invasions" (Sindelar 28 Apr 2014).

*Russian Life* magazine notes that "The bug's color is similar to the orange-and-black ribbon used to symbolize Russian and Soviet valor since the eighteenth century, when the Order of St. George was established" (Antonova 2014: 18). In "New Russian–Ukrainian Dictionary," a discussion of ten neologisms that appears on numerous Russian websites ("Novyi russko-ukrainskii slovar'" 21 Jul 2014), the unknown author claims *kolorad* was coined the very day that former president Yanukovich left Ukraine, and that Yanukovich's supporters sported the ribbon, now worn by fighters

in the Donbas Basin of east Ukraine around the city of Donetsk. It is characteristic of these new "swerve" usages that detailed origin stories can build up around them. While it would be inappropriate to include suspect etymological information in dictionaries, even false origin stories can shed light on the denotation and connotation of a target word or expression. Below is a captivating illustrative example with *kolorad*, poking fun at the current president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko. It appears that the usual negative connotation of the word has been subverted through reappropriation:

(10) Порошенко – как картошка. Если летом **колорады** не съедят, то осенью уберут. А если зимой не замёрзнет – весной посадят (<http://goo.gl/TfQj5P>). [Poroshenko is like a potato. If the *kolorady* (i.e. militants) don't eat him in the summer, they'll get him in the fall. And if he doesn't freeze in the winter, they'll plant/imprison him in the spring.]

The Russian verb *posadit'* can mean both "to plant" and to "imprison," a play on words that fits this (probably) pro-Russian usage of the usually anti-Russian *kolorady*. Below the more common (negative) connotation of *kolorady* is exemplified:

(11) все, вот теперь точно амбец вам, **колорады**... (<http://goo.gl/m6QIoI>) [That's it, now you are finished for sure, *kolorady*...]

In the international sphere the meaning of *kolorad* is being extended: from pro-Russian soldier to citizen supporting Russian policy in Ukraine, it has moved to denote anything Russian or having something to do with Russia – with negative connotation. As reported widely in the media, to encourage the boycott of Russian goods, activists in Lithuania put stickers with the image of the Colorado potato bug on their foods and products in grocery stores.

## 7 Top-Down Linguistic Innovation

Most of the new usages of this "linguistic swerve" have moved from common speech and/or social media "up," toward more standard and formal speech and media. There is evidence that the next word, while not new, was given a new meaning by the Putin administration and the formal Russian media before it expanded "downward" into everyday speech and (uncontrived) social media expression. In fact, this new meaning appears to have been created at the very top, by Vladimir Putin himself. Mikhail Iampol'skii writes in *The New Times* that initially *natsional-predatel'* "national traitor" denoted a collaborationist, someone assisting an occupying regime. The word, he says, was first applied to those on the German side who signed the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Later it was applied to the followers of Phillippe Petain in France and of Andrei Vlasov in Russia; these military leaders collaborated with the Germans during World War II from within their respective countries (Iampol'skii 24 Mar 2014). Vishnevetskaia (2015) mentions that more recently, in the late 1990s, Chechen terrorists used the word for people who collaborated with the Russian government in Chechnya, a meaning still very much in line with that in the earlier historical examples. Putin would give the word a brand new twist. As reported in *The New Yorker*: "In an address to Parliament on March 18<sup>th</sup> [2014, two days after the referendum on the Crimea], Putin raised the spectre of 'a fifth column' – a 'disparate bunch of national traitors' – sowing discord inside Russia" (Yaffa 28 Mar 2014). The change in meaning is that there are no occupying forces in Russia with whom the present-day "national traitors" could collaborate. Iampol'skii calls Putin's technique totalitarian speech (Iampol'skii 24 Mar 2014; Iampolski 11 Apr 2014). *Natsional-predatel'*, a word that always had a



strong negative connotation, now denotes something quite different but with an equally strong negative connotation: people who hold or express opinions not in line with those of the leaders of their government. It is less important what exactly the new word means (denotation), and more important that people understand its undesirability as a label – its negative connotation.

This usage from the top quickly entered the highly controlled Russian media. The well-known Russian rock musician Andrei Makarevich, as the next example illustrates, was labeled as a "national-traitor" for performing in Ukraine:

(12) Проханов: «Макаревич преступник и **национал-предатель**, у которого руки в крови» 13 Aug 2014. <http://goo.gl/EDJfv4> [Prokhanov: “Makarevich is a criminal and national traitor, whose hands are bloody.”]

Makarevich lost the possibility to perform in Russia as his concert engagements were canceled. In addition, leading liberals were labeled in Internet lists as "national-traitors" for some form of speech or action. "National-traitor" illustrates well the fluidity of the borders between Starodubseva's levels, and that, while it might be less common, these new usages can migrate "down" into colloquial speech and social media, rather than originating in them.

## 8 Conclusion

As a prime example of the need to present more information on connotation to dictionary users, the present linguistic situation in the Russian language requires the full attention of lexicographers. Clear illustrative examples will be needed to support explanations of meaning if lexicographers are to capture the fast-changing and sometimes multiple connotations, frequent reappropriations, and other lexical phenomena of the new usages. The explanations of meaning themselves will need to address broadening, narrowing, or other changes of meaning; multiple senses, and alterations of historical meaning.

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